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STATE CIVIL POWER OVER RESERVATION INDIANS
by John F. Sullivan
INTRODUCTION
Defining the legal relationship of a state to reservation Indians
within a state's boundaries is a problem with which this nation's courts
have struggled from the earliest days of the Republic. The problem
has not submitted to solution by way of principles uniformly under-
stood and consistently applied. Confusion and inconsistency is more
the rule than the exception. This will continue, with the undesirable
effects which confusion and inconsistency inevitably breed, until those
responsible for defining the extent of state power over reservation
Indians analyze carefully what has already been authoritatevly said
about the nature of the state/reservation Indian relationship.
It is the purpose of this note to discover: 1) the power of a state
to exercise court jurisdiction over civil actions which are based on
events that occur within Indian country,' and to which one of the
parties is an Indian (hereinafter, this set of limitations will be referred
to simply as "state court jurisdiction"); and 2) the power of a state
to impose its civil laws on Indians within Indian country (hereinafter,
these limitations will be referred to as "imposition of state laws") .2 In
both cases, analysis is limited to instances where state court jurisdiction
and imposition of state laws is attempted without Congressional author-
ization, or without compliance with conditions precedent for obtaining
Congressional authorization.
State court jurisdiction and imposition of state laws can be anal-
yzed as historical and legal problems by focusing primary attention
on: 1) state constitutional provisions for retention by the federal gov-
ernment of absolute jurisdiction and control over Indian lands; 2) the
landmark United States Supreme Court decision in Williams v. Lee; and
3) the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Kennerly v. Dis-
trict Court of the Ninth Judicial District of Montana.4
COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS FOR ABSOLUTE FEDERAL JURISDICTION
AND CONTROL OVER INDIAN LANDS
A number of states were admitted into the Union with disclaimer
'Indian country may be most simply defined as that land located within the exterior
boundaries of an Indian reservation. This, in essence, is the definition that Congress
gave to the term in 1948. See, 62 Stat. 757 (1948), 18 U.S.C. §1151 (1970).
2Though state court jurisdiction and imposition of state laws may be conceptually
distinguished, there may in application be little practical difference between the two.
For example, if it is found that a state has no court jurisdiction, then, of course, an
imposition of state laws would be of no practical consequence, for the imposition
would be unenforceable. E.g., Commissioner of Taxation v. Brun, 286 Minn 43, 174
N.W.2d 120, 126 (1970).
8358 U.S. 217 (1959).
'400 U.S. 423 (1971).
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provisions in their statehood acts to the effect that the federal govern-
ment retains absolute jurisdiction and control over the Indian lands
within the states' borders.5 Moreover, many states included this dis-
claimer provision in their constitutions.6 These states constitutional
disclaimers are substantially indentical. Montana's provision reads, in
pertinent part:
Second. That the people inhabiting the said proposed state ofMontana do agree and declare that they forever disclaim all right
and title to the unappropriated public lands lying within the bound-
aries thereof, and to all lands lying within said limits owned orheld by any Indian or Indian tribes, and that, until the title thereto
shall have been extinguished by the United States, the same shallbe and remain subject to the disposition of the United States, and
said Indian lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and
control of the congress of the United States; . . .
The key phrase with respect to state jurisdiction and imposition of
state laws is, ". . . Indian lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdic-
tion and control of the congress of the United States." That phrase,
inexplicably, means different things to different courts.
Arizona is presently the least restrictive (from the state's point
of view) in the interpretation of its disclaimer provision. In McClanahan
v. State Tax Commission,' an Arizona Court of Appeals said that its
disclaimer ". . . deals with disclaimers of title to land owned or held by an
Indian or an Indian tribe." (Emphasis supplied). Therefore, whether
the disclaimer prevents a particular exercise of state court jurisdiction
or imposition of state laws depends on whether, by means of the exer-
cise or imposition, ". . . the State of Arizona is . . . asserting any
ownership or proprietary interest in Indian lands."9
New Mexico's interpretation of its disclaimer is only slightly, if at
all, more restrictive than that of Arizona. In Ghahate v. Bureau of Reve-
nue,10 the New Mexico Court of Appeals held its disclaimer to be
'E.g., 25 Stat. 676, 677 (1889), which applies to the admission of Montana, North
Dakota, South Dakota and Washington; 28 Stat. 107, 108 (1894), which applies to
the admission of Utah; 36 Stat. 557, 558-559 (1910), which applies to the admission
of New Mexico; and 36 Stat. 557, 569 (1910), which applies to the admission of
Arizona.
8E.g., Arizona, Amz. CONST. art. XX, §4; Idaho, IDAHO CoNsT. art. XXI, §19 [ratified
by Congress, 26 Stat. 215 (1890)], Montana, MONT. CONST. ord. No. 1, §2; North
Dakota, N.D. CONST., §203; New Mexico, N.M. CONST. art. XXI, §2; South Dakota,
S.D. CONST. art. XXII; Washington, WASH. CONST. art. XXVI; and Wyoming, Wyo.
CoNST. art. XXI, §26 [ratified by Congress, 26 Stat. 222 (1890)].
114 Ariz.App. 452, 484 P.2d 221 (1971).
s1d. at 225.
sId. In formulating this interpretation of its disclaimer provision, the Arizona Court
relied heavily on dicta contained in Organized Village of Kalce v. Egan, 369 U.S.
60 (1962). In that case the United States Supreme Court made the following com-
ments about the meaning of disclaimer provisions: at 69, 1) "The disclaimer of
right and title by the State was a disclaimer of proprietary rather than governmental
interest"; at 68, 2) "'. . . 'absolute' federal jurisdiction is not invariably exclusivejurisdiction"; and at 71, 3) ". . . the words 'absolute jurisdiction and control'
are not intended to oust the State completely from regulation of Indian 'prop-
erty' . .
"°80 N.M. 98, 451 P.2d 1002 (1969).
[Vol. 33
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"... not applicable where there is no issue concerning Indian lands"11
(Emphasis supplied). Apparently, there will be no "issue concerning In-
dian lands" unless title, right of possession or control of Indian lands
is drawn in question by a particular imposition of state laws or exer-
cise of state court jurisdiction. 12 Also, the New Mexico Supreme Court
has said that the disclaimer provision is a disclaimer of proprietary
rather than governmental interest. 3
The most restrictive interpretation of a disclaimer provision is that
of South Dakota. In Smith v. Temple, 4 the South Dakota Supreme
Court said :15
1. The disclaimer of jurisdiction contained in our Enabling
Act and Constitution deprives our state of criminal jurisdiction over
Indians and Indian territory; . . .
3. Criminal jurisdiction over Indians for crimes committed
within Indian territory in South Dakota is exclusively vested in the
Federal and Tribal courts.
The same principles govern and the same conclusion applies
to state civil jurisdiction over an enrolled tribal Indian defendant
in a cause of action arising within Indian country.
In accordance with these principles, the South Dakota Court held spe-
cifically that its courts had no jurisdiction in a tort action by one Indian
against other Indians for injuries received in an automobile accident
which occurred within the exterior boundaries of an Indian reservation.
Broadly read, Smith means that the disclaimer provision prohibits exer-
cise of state court jurisdiction and imposition of state laws, unless ex-
pressly authorized by Congress or by decisions of the United States
Supreme Court.
It is not presently clear how Montana interprets its disclaimer pro-
vision, though the strongest indications are that it is in a manner
similar to that of South Dakota. In United States v. Partello,'6 Montana's
Federal Court said:17
It was agreed by the ordinance [Section 2 of Ordinance No. 1, Mon-
tana Constitution] . . . that congress was to retain the absolutejurisdiction and control over these Indian lands within the Indian
reservations in Montana. The word "jurisdiction," as used in the
above clause, when applied to congress, means the power of govern-
ing such lands; to legislate for them; the power or right of exercising
authority over them. These are the definitions of this word which
will be found in Webster's Dictionary. When we speak of the right
"Id. at 1005.
121d.
13Paiz v. Hughes, 76 N.M. 562, 417 P.2d 51, 53 (1966).
"82 S.D. 650, 152 N.W.2d 547 (1967). It is significant that this decision was rendered
five years after that in Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, supra note 9. Apparently,
the South Dakota Supreme Court does not consider Kake as authoritatively controlling
on questions of interpretation of state constitutional disclaimer provisions, since the
South Dakota Court does not cite nor discuss the less restrictive Kake language
quoted supra in note 9.
'Id. at 548.
1648 F. 670 (C.C. D.Mont. 1891).
17Id. at 676.
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to govern certain lands, we not only mean the right to do some
thing with the land itself, hut to legislate for and control the people
upon said lands, as well as to legislate concerning the land itself.
When we say congress has the right to legislate for a place within
its exclusive jurisdiction, we mean for the people who are there, as
well as concerning the land itself. (Emphasis supplied.)
This Partello language was quoted with approval by the Montana Su-
preme Court in State ex rel. Irvine v. District Court.'5 Very recently,
in Crow Tribe of Indians v. Deernose,19 the Montana Supreme Court
held that the disclaimer provision prevented our state courts from
having subject matter jurisdiction over a foreclosure suit involving In-
dian trust lands, unless such jurisdiction has been granted state courts
by an act of Congress.
20
Of course, Crow Tribe only applies, at its broadest, to suits involving
Indian lands. Also, the restrictive language in Partello and Irvine, re-
garding Indian persons, pre-dates the United States Supreme Court
decision in Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, which, as pointed out
in note 9 supra, contains dicta that would sanction a much less restrictive
interpretation of our disclaimer provision. Thus, a clear and definitive
statement of Montana's interpretation of its disclaimer provision cannot,
with certainty, be presently made.
Though an extended discussion about the accuracy of the different
interpretation of disclaimers might be interesting, the problem of how
a disclaimer provision ought properly to be read is today in large part
academic. There are limitations on the exercise of court jurisdiction and
the imposition of state laws other (and, except in the case of South
Dakota, more stringent) than those that may or may not be contained
in disclaimer provisions. These other limitations have been expressed
by the United States Supreme Court in Williams v. Lee and Kennerly v.
District Court of the Ninth Judicial District of Montana.
18125 Mont. 398, 239 P.2d 272, 276 (1951).
........ Mont ......... 487 P.2d 1133 (1971).
1id. at 1134-1135. It should be noted that the Montana Court in Crow Tribe also held
that 25 U.S.C. §483a (70 Stat. 62), enacted by Congress in 1956, is not an express
grant of state jurisdiction over foreclosure suits concerning reservation trust lands.
This act provides that:
The individual Indian owners of any land which either is held by the
United States in trust for them or is subject to a restriction against aliena-
tion imposed by the United States are authorized, subject to approval by
the Secretary of the Interior, to execute a mortgage or deed of trust to
such land. Such land shall be subject to foreclosure or sale pursuant to the
terms of such mortgage or deed of trust in accordance with the laws of the
State or Territory in which the land is located. For the purpose of any
foreclosure or sale proceeding the Indian owner shall be regarded as vested
with an unrestricted fee simple title to the land, the United States shall not
be a necessary party to the proceeding, and any conveyance of the land pur-
suant to proceedings shall divest the United States of title to the land.
All mortgages and deeds of trust to such land heretofore approved by the
Secretary of the Interior are ratified and confirmed.
In construing this Act, the Montana Court said at 1136:
This statute by its language simply authorizes individual Indians to
mortgage lands held in trust by the United States for their use and benefit,
with the consent of the Secretary of the Interior, and permits such mortgages
[Vol. 33
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PRE-WILLIAMS AND KENNERLY: A BRIEF
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
In order to properly understand Williams and Kennerly it is essential
to have some historical perspective as to the nature of Indian tribes,
their reservations, and the relationship of the inhabitants of these reser-
vations to the states in which the reservations are located.
In the beginning Indian tribes were separate nations within what
has come to be the United States.2 1 As separate nations, they possessed
all the powers of any sovereign nation. Through conquest and treaties
they were induced to give up their total sovereignty in exchange, prin-
cipally, for grants of land from the federal government. Conquest and
treaties effectively terminated the external powers of sovereignty of the
tribes. For example, the tribes no longer had power to make war or
enter into treaties with foreign nations. Moreover, the internal powers
of sovereignty of the tribes, the power to regulate the internal affairs
of land set aside for them by the federal government, was made subject
to the legislative power of the federal government.22 Was the tribal
power to regulate internal reservation affairs also made subject to the
legislative powers of the states within which the reservation lay? This
question was early answered by the United States Supreme Court in
the landmark case of Worcester v. Georgia.23
About 1830 the Georgia Legislature enacted laws which, in effect,
forbade Indians on the Cherokee Reservation from enacting their own
laws or holding court.24 Worcester was the case in which the validity
of the Georgia action was tested. In the course of Chief Justice Mar-
shall's exhaustive opinion for the Court it was held that: 1) Georgia's
assertion of power was invalid; 2) Indian tribes are distinct political
entities, with the right of self-government, having exclusive authority
of all matters which occur within their territorial boundaries; and 3) In-
dian reservations are not subject to the laws or courts of the state or
to be foreclosed in accordance with state law. It has nothing to do with
granting jurisdiction to state courts in such mortgage foreclosure actions,
and pointedly avoids the use of the term "jurisdiction".
The Court's conclusion seems to be based on the proposition that when Congress
intends to allow state courts to assume jurisdiction in a particular instance, the term
"jurisdiction" is specifically used. This proposition is not invariably true. For
example, 25 U.S.C. §231 (1929, 45 Stat. 1185; amended 1946, 60 Stat. 962), which
authorizes states to enforce some of their health and education laws against reserva-
tion Indians, does not use the term "jurisdiction"; nevertheless, this act has been
held an express Congressional grant of jurisdiction to state courts, for the purpose
of enforcing state health and education laws. See, In re Colwash, 57 Wash.2d 196,
356 P.2d 994 (1960). Without expressing an opinion as to the correctness of the
Montana Court's ultimate conclusion, it is the author's belief that had the Court
engaged in more thorough analysis than is indicated by the opinion it could have
found better reasons than it gave to support its holding.
"Williams v. Lee, supra note 3 at 218.
2See, COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAWS, 122 (1942); and Native American
Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131, 134 (10th Cir. 1959).
131 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
'The Georgia laws are set forth Id. at 487-489.
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states in which they are located, nor even to federal laws or courts,
unless subjugation to state or federal laws and courts is expressly au-
thorized by federal legislation.
For the sake of clarity in later analysis, the broad principle of
Worcester, that an Indian reservation is, as to states, a distinct nation
within whose boundaries state laws and courts cannot of their own
force penetrate, may be stated in two principles: 1) states have no
power unilaterally to impose their laws and courts with respect to mat-
ters within an Indian reservation that involve or affect Indians (here-
inafter this will be referred to simply as "the first Worcester principle")
and 2) states have no power unilaterally to impose their laws and
courts with respect to matters within an Indian reservation that do not
involve or affect Indians (hereinafter referred to as "the second Wor-
cester principle").
The relationship between Indian reservations and states, as defined
in Worcester, has not remained constant. The second Worcester prin-
ciple has been substantially modified over the years by the United
States Supreme Court. Thus, :in Langford v. Monteith25 it was held that
process may be served within a reservation for a suit in territorial court
between two non-Indians. In United States v. McBrantney2e and Draper
v. United States27 the Supreme Court held that the murder of one non-
Indian by another non-Indian on a reservation was a matter for state law.
In Thomas v. Gay28 a state tax on cattle of non-Indian lessees of reserva-
tion land was upheld.29 Finally, 'in Utah and Northern Railway v. Fisher0
a territorial tax on a non-Indian railroad that ran through a reservation
was held valid.
In effect, what the United' States Supreme Court has said is that
in at least some matters concerning non-Indians, Indian reservations
are not to be considered "distinct political entities." On the contrary, in
some matters that effect or involve only non-Indians a reservation is a
part of the surrounding state, subject to its court jurisdiction and laws;
and this is the case in spite of the previously discussed disclaimer pro-
visions. 1
The first Worcester principle, on the other hand, has been fairly
consistently adhered to by the United States Supreme Court. For ex-
-102 U.S. 145 (1880). See also, Stiff v. McLaughlin, 19 Mont. 300, 48 P. 232 (1897).
U104 U.S. 621 (1882).
-164 U.S. 240 (1896). See also, State ex rel. Nepstad v. Danielson, 149 Mont. 438,
427 P.2d 689 (1967).
-169 U.S. 264 (1898). See also Casier v. McMillan, 22 Mont. 484, 56 P. 965 (1899).
tmThe Court in Thomas v. Gay, supra note 28, did note that because the lands on which
the taxed cattle grazed were Indian lands, the tax might have some effect on Indians.
However, the Court found the effect too remote to compel a holding that the state
tax was invalid.
'-116 U.S. 28 (1885).
uSee, Draper v. United States, upra note 27 at 245, 247.
[Vol. 33
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ample, in The Kansas Indians32 it was held that a state has no power
to tax Indian lands. The Court said :33
If the tribal organization of the [Indians] is preserved intact, and
recognized by the political department of the government as existing,
then they are a "people distinct from others," . . . separated from
the jurisdiction of [the State], and to be governed exclusively by
the government of the Union. If under the control of Congress,
from necessity there can be no divided authority. . . .As long as
the United States recognizes their national character they are
under the protection of treaties and the laws of Congress, and
their property is withdrawn from the operation of State laws.
In United States v. Kagama3 4 the following comment appears :5
[The Indians] were, and always have been, regarded as having a
semi-independent position when they preserved their tribal relations;
not as States, not as nations, not as possessed of full attributes of
sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power of regulating
their internal and social relations, and thus far not brought under
the laws ... of the State within whose limits they resided.
However, in Felix v. Patricks" and United States v. Candelaria"7 the Uni-
ted States Supreme Court authorized state court jurisdiction over suits
by Indians against non-Indians to enforce title to Indian land. The hold-
ings of these cases represent a slight erosion of the first Worcester
principle, which, stated in light of these decisions, would provide that
states have no power unilaterally to impose their laws and courts with
respect to matters within an Indian reservation that involve or effect
Indians, except that an Indian may bring a civil action in state court
to redress wrongs against his person and property, allegedly committed
by a non-Indian.38 The principle, as thus modified, has been termed an
"anomalous jurisdictional anachronism" 39, and the label is appropriate,
for Felix and Candelaria do not appear to be products of the Supreme
Court's concern with problems of state power over reservation Indians
and modifications of Worcester principles, but rather with the fact that
state courts are, by their state constitutions, open to all persons for the
redress of grievances, and Indians are persons.40
This was the state of the law when, in 1959, the Supreme Court
decided Williams v. Lee. It must now be considered whether the opinion
in Williams was intended to provide for a further erosion, or perhaps
restatement, of the Worcester principles.
WILLIAMS V. LEE: A CHANGE IN DIRECTION?
In Williams the Arizona Supreme Court had held41 that Arizona
-72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1866).
"Id. at 755, 757.
-118 U.S. 375 (1886).
9Id. at 381-382.
-145 U.S. 317 (1892).
"271 U.S. 432 (1926).
"This, also, is the case in spite of the previously discussed disclaimer provisions. See,
Smith v. Temple, supra note 14 at 548.
"Smith v. Temple, supra note 14 at 548.
WOFelix v. Patrick, supra note 36 at 332.
183 Ariz. 241, 319 P.2d 998 (1958).
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courts1 4 tiiWt iouovLer a civi lb suit againstresrvaiull Inialn3 Ji
goods sold them on credit on the reservation by a non-Indian who
operated a general store within the exterior boundaries of the Navajo
Indian Reservation and the State of Arizona. The judgment was reversed
by the United States Supreme Court, on certiorari. The opinion of the
unaminous court stated,42 with respect to Worcester:
Over the years this Court has modified . . . [the Worcester] prin-
ciples in cases where essential tribal relations were not involved
and where the rights of Indians would not be jeopardized, but the
basic policy of Worcester has remained.
After reviewing the Supreme Court decisions that had modified Wor-
cester's principles, the Court went on to say :43
Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has
always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reser-
vation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.
After a brief discussion of the history of the Navajo Tribe, noting that
tribal courts would have had jurisdiction over the suit, the Court
concluded :44
There can be no doubt that to allow the exercise of state jurisdiction
here would undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reser-
vation affairs and hence would infringe on the right of the In-
dians to govern themselves .... If this power [of self-government]
is to be taken away from them, it is for Congress to do it.
The Court did not clearly say why "there can be no doubt that to
allow the exercise of state jurisdiction here . ..would infringe on the
right of the Indians to govern themselves." There are two possibilities.
First, it was merely a conclusion drawn from the particular facts and
circumstances of the case (as indicated, the Court noted that tribal
courts had jurisdiction over the controversy), with the implication that
given other facts and circumstances (perhaps lack of tribal court juris-
diction) the Court would approve a unilateral imposition of state laws
or an exercise of state court jurisdiction with respect to matters within
an Indian reservation that involve or effect Indians. Under this inter-
pretation, the Williams "question" as to "whether the state action in-
fringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws
and be ruled by them" is viewed as a substantive test that restates and
modifies both the first and second Worcester principles. The second
way to interpret Williams, however, is to say that the mere fact that
the state dealt with matters within an Indian reservation that involved
or effected Indians makes the state action one that "infringed on the
right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
them." Under this interpretation, the Williams "question" is a substantive
test with respect to the second Worcester principle, but a conclusion with
respect to the first Worcester principle.
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Admittedly, elementary analysis of the above quoted language from
Williams would incline one to the view that the first interpretation is
more plausible. Nevertheless, there is just enough other language in the
decision to lend a reasonable doubt as to its true meaning. Immediately
following what appears to be the substantive test language the Court
remarked :45
Congress has also acted consistently upon the assumption that the
States have no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on a reser-
vation. . . . Significantly, when Congress has wished the States
to exercise this power [civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indians]
it has expressly granted them the jurisdiction which Worcester v.
Georgia had denied.
This language, especially the first sentence, gives cause to wonder
whether, except for the Felix v. Patrick exception, discussed infra, the
first principle of Worcester was intended by the court in Williams to
remain unmodified.
The element of reasonable doubt about the correct interpretation of
Williams led the Supreme Court of Washington to opt for the second
interpretation of Williams, remarking, in 1960, that :46
... [T]he jurisdiction of the federal government over Indian tribes
and enrolled members of such tribes, while they are on Indian
reservations, is exclusive ...
In a long line of cases beginning with Worcester v. State of Georgia
... and continuing to the recent decision of Williams v. Lee ... the
United States supreme court has recognized the exclusive jurisdiction
of Congress over the affairs of enrolled Indians on Indian reser-
vations .... [Tlhe courts of this state . . . have no jurisdiction [over
reservation Indians] beyond that expressly granted by Congress.
Fortunately, the United States Supreme Court rendered assistance
as to what it meant in Williams by way of a dictum contained in the
1962 decision of Organized Village of Kake v. Egan.47 In Kake the Court
said :48
These decisions [Williams v. Lee, notably] indicate that even on
reservations state laws may be applied to Indians unless such appli-
cation would interfere with reservation self-government or impair
a right granted or reserved by federal law.
Though the language used is somewhat different than that of Williams,
it is concluding language, and in the preceeding paragraph 49 the Kake
Court set forth the Williams substantive test language verbatim. Thus,
it is, after Kake, almost certain that Williams was intended to mean that
states can unilaterally exercise court jurisdiction over or impose their
"State ex reZ. Adams v. Superior Court, 57 Wash.2d 181, 356 P.2d 985, 987-988 (1960).
Adams specifically held that Washington Courts do not have jurisdiction to unilateral-
ly declare reservation Indian children deprived and dependent, thereby permanently
depriving their parents of custody of their children, and making the children wards
of the state, subject to adoption.
"
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laws on all persons (Indian or non-Indian) in Indian country, so long
as it can be said that such state action does not infringe on the right of
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them; and
this is apparently the test in spite of state constitutional disclaimer
provisions. 50
Yet, though the Supreme Court has apparently authorized states to
impose their laws and courts on reservation Indians, the state and
lower federal courts have shown varying degrees of willingness to ap-
prove such impositions. The most marked area of conflict has been over
whether reservation Indians could be required to pay state personal
income taxes. A review of the state court decisions on this issue pro-
vides a good (and for purposes of this note, sufficient) example of
courts' attempts to apply the amorphous Williams test. 51
50Id. at 67-68. It should also be noted that in 1964, in Warren Trading Post Co. v.
Arizona Tax Commission, 380 U.S. 685 (1964), the United States Supreme Court placed
a further limitation on the exercise of state power over persons within an Indian
reservation. The Court held invalid a state tax imposed on a reservation Indian
trader, saying, at 690: "Congress has taken the business of Indian trading on
reservations so fully in hand that no room remains for state laws imposing additional
burdens on traders." In other words, if Congress has broadly legislated in (i.e., pre-
empted) a particular field, state power must yield. Of course, it hardly needs to be
said that if Congress expressly forbids a particular exercise of state court jurisdiction
or imposition of state laws on reservation inhabitants, then, again, the state would
be without power. See, Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, supra note 9 at 72.
81In addition to the disputes over the application of personal income tax, which the
author merely uses as exemplary of the potential problems of application of the
Williams test, the reader might also wish to examine: 1) Whyte v. District Court of
Montezuma County, 140 Colo. 334, 346 P.2d 1012 (1959), where the Colorado Supreme
Court held that its state courts had no jurisdiction over a divorce action where both
parties were reservation Indians who had been married on the reservation. At 1014
the Court said:
Surely, if a non-Indian's rights under a contract made with an Indian
on an Indian reservation are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribal
court [referring to Williams], it must follow that a contract of marriage
entered into on an Indian reservation between two enrolled members of the
tribe must be governed by tribal law.
2) Sigana v. Bailey, 282 Minn. 367, 164 N.W.2d 886 (1969), in which the Supreme
Court of Minnesota held that its state courts had no jurisdiction over an action in
tort for injuries arising from an automobile collision which occurred within the ex-
terior boundaries of an Indian reservation, in which all of the parties to the action
were Indians, residents of the reservation (contra, Paiz v. Hughes, 76 N.M. 562, 417
P.2d 51 (1966), involving non-Indian defendants); 3) Kain v. Wilson, 83 S.D. 482,
161 N.W.2d 704 (1968), where the South Dakota Supreme Court held, at 706, that:
. . . [T]he conclusion is inescapable that our state courts have no jurisdic-
tion to hear and determine a civil action [by a non-Indian] for the alleged
wrongful use and possession of land located in Indian Country by a tribal
Indian defendant. To impose state law and state jurisdiction in this con-
troversy would infringe upon the . . . Indians' right and power to make
their own laws and be ruled by them.
4) State of Arizona ex rel. Merrill v. Turtle, 413 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970), in which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
Arizona could not exercise extradition jurisdiction over Indian residents of the Navajo
Reservation. (The decision is of particular interest because it is, in the author's
opinion, the best reasoned application of the Williams test yet rendered.) 5) Your
Food Stores, Inc. (N.S.L.) v. Village of Espanola, 68 N.M. 327, 361 P.2d 950 (1961),
in which the New Mexico Court held that to allow a municipality to annex a portion of
an Indian reservation and make the annexed land subject to the jurisdiction of the
municipality would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves. 6)
Commissioner of Taxation v. Brun, 286 Minn. 43, 174 N.W.2d 120, 122 (1970), in
which the Minnesota Court approved a ruling of the Minnesota Department of Em-
ployment Security that reservation Indians are not liable to make contributions to
10
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In McClanahan v. State Tax Commission and Ghahate v. Bureau of
Revenue, Arizona and New Mexico held that requiring Indians, who live
and are employed on reservations, to pay state income taxes on their
earnings does not interfere with the Indians' right to make their own
laws and be ruled by them. In Ghahate the New Mexico Court was aided
by the fact that both parties stipulated that the Indian tribe itself was
not inconvenience nor in any way interfered with because its Indians
were required to pay personal income taxes to the state.52 This stipu-
lation dictated the result. The court said: "The stipulated facts show
that the tax does not interfere with reservation self-government." 58 In
McClanahan, the Arizona Court was not blessed with a Ghahate-type
stipulation, and so was forced to reason an application of the Williams
test. The Court said :54
... [Wie [do not] believe the fact that plaintiff as a Navajo Indian
is required to pay the income tax on income derived soley from
sources within the reservation results in an infringement on the
Navajo tribe's right of self government. In determining whether
such an infringement exists, we are aided by an examination of
those early cases dealing with the federal-state dichotomy of income
taxation. Thus, as was held in Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405,
58 S.Ct. 969, 82 L.Ed. 1427 (1938), when dealing with the problem
of whether state employees were required to pay federal income
taxes and the extent that such taxation infringed upon the sover-
eignty of the state:
Even though, to some unacertainable extent, the tax deprived
the state of the advantage of paying less than the standard rate
for the services which they engage, it does not curtail any of
those functions which have been thought hitherto to be essential
to their continued existence as states. [Emphasis by the court.]
[Since the federal income tax as applied to state employees does not
interfere with the essential functions of state governments,] .. .
how can it be seriously argued that an income tax by the State of
Arizona upon a Navajo Indian, regardless of his employer, causes an
impairment of the right of the Navajo tribe to be self governing?
We believe it cannot. 55
Directly contrary to McClanahan and Ghahate is the 1970 decision
of the Supreme Court of Minnesota in Commissioner of Taxation v. Brun.
In Brun it was held that :56
It cannot be argued that siphoning off part of the earnings from
[Indian] employees of a sawmill [located on the reservation and]
operated for the benefit and welfare of enrolled members of the tribe
[for payment of state personal income taxes] does not interfere
with the tribal right of self-government.
the Minnesota unemployment insurance fund. The decisions indicate that the amount
of power a state may be allowed to exercise over reservation inhabitants under the
Williams test is minimal.
"Ghahate v. Bureau of Revenue, supra note 10 at 1004.
b'Id.
"McClanahan v. State Tax Commission, supra note 7 at 224.
6'The author finds this reasoning highly questionable since it proceeds on the basis of
a weak analogy between the federal/state relationship and the state/Indian reserva-
tion relationship.
wCommissioner of Taxation v. Brun, supra note 51 at 126. 11
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The decisions in Ghahate and McClanahan are perhaps reconciliable
on the ground that the Minnesota Court in Brun placed heavy emphasis
on the fact that the Indians from whom Minnesota sought tax were
"unique,15 7 that "few Indian tribes in the United States retain the
sovereignty and the right to self government retained by the [Indians
in question],"58 and that, as a result, ". .. little help can be obtained
from the decisions of other state courts. . . ."59 Nevertheless, it seems
from the decision in Brun, that the only reason the Indians in question
were considered "unique" is that the Minnesota Court over the years
has chosen to consider them "unique", and has consistently resisted at-
tempts by the state to impose their laws or courts on these Indians.60
If that is the case, then the result is simply that three state courts, all
considering the same issue in light of the Williams test, have reached
contrary results.
One could argue with merit for either position, but today that
would probably be wasted effort; for, about a year after Brun was
decided, the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision in Ken-
nerly v. District Court of the Ninth Judicial District of Montana, and, as
will be seen, this decision should have a substantial impact on the
current validity of the decisions in McClanahan, Ghahate, and Brun.
KENNERLY V. DISTRICT COURT:
A SUPREME COURT DOUBLE REVERSE
In Kennerly the Montana Supreme Court had held' that its courts
had jurisdiction over a civil action against reservation Indians for an
unpaid debt arising from transactions that occurred within the exterior
boundaries of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation. The principal ground 2
for assumption of state jurisdiction was the fact that the Blackfeet
Tribal Council had adopted a statute which provided that:
The Tribal Court and the State shall have concurrent and not
exclusive jurisdiction of all suits wherein the defendant is a member
of the Tribe which is brought before the Courts.63
The Montana Court logically reasoned that its assumption of juris-
diction would not, under the Williams test, infringe on the right of
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them, since
Indian tribes have the power absent some treaty provision or act of
Congress to the contrary, to enact their own laws for the govern-





p154 Mont. 488, 466 P.2d 85 (1970).
"Another ground was an attempted distinguishing of Williams. This was politely dis-
missed by the United States Supreme Court in a footnote. Kennerly, supra note 4, n. 3.
GIBLACKFEET TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER CODE, Ch]. 2, Civil Action, §1 (1967).
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Since the Indians themselves enacted the law granting jurisdiction con-
current with the tribal courts to the state, an exercise of the power
granted certainly could not be said to interfere with the right of the
Indians to govern themselves. In other words, it seems perfectly logical
that the Indians, with their right of self-government, could cede to a
state the court jurisdiction which Williams had expressly denied.
The United States Supreme Court did not agree, and, on certiorari
(without argument), the judgment of the Montana Court was vacated
and remanded for further proceedings. 6 5
The United States Supreme Court noted the Williams language
that, "[e]ssentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has
always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reserva-
tion Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them." 66 (Emphasis
supplied.) But the Supreme Court dismissed any possible application of
this Williams language to the entire problem of state court jurisdiction
when it said:67
With regard to the particular question of the extension of statejurisdiction over civil causes of action by or against Indians aris-
ing . . . [within the exterior boundaries of an Indian reservation],
there was, at the time of the tribal council resolution, a "governing
Act of Congress ' 68 ... [which] conditioned the assumption of [such]
state jurisdiction on "affirmative legislative action" by the State.
... Here it is conceded that Montana... [did not take the required]
affirmative legislative action with respect to the Blackfeet Reserva-
tion.69 The unilateral action of the Tribal Council was insufficient
to vest Montana with jurisdiction ... [over civil causes of action by
or against Indians arising within the exterior boundaries of an Indian
reservation under the governing Act of Congress, since it was not
the required "affirmative legislative action" by the state.]70
"To the author's knowledge, no further proceedings were taken in the case.
"Kennerly, supra note 4 at 426-427.
67Id. at 427.
"The "governing Act" to which the Supreme Court made reference was the Act of
August 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 590. The pertinent portion of the Act is Section 7, which
provided:
Section 7. The consent of the United States is hereby given to any
... State not having jurisdiction with respect to . . . civil causes of action,
as provided for in this Act [jurisdiction over civil causes of action between
Indians or to which Indians are parties which arise in the areas of Indian
Country], to assume jurisdiction at such time and in such manner as the
people of the State shall, by affirmative legislative action, obligate and
bind the State to assumption thereof.
"Nor, it should be noted, did Montana take the required affirmative legislative action
with respect to the extension of state civil jurisdiction over actions involving Indians
which arise on any of the seven Indian reservations in Montana.
70The Court went on to hold that the unilateral action of the Blackfeet Tribal Council
was also insufficient to vest Montana with jurisdiction under the provisions of the
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1968, 82 Stat. 79. Title IV of this Act repealed Section 7 of
the 1953 Act, and substituted a new scheme for the extension of state civil jurisdiction
over actions involving Indians that arise within the exterior boundaries of an Indian
reservation. Section 402(a) of this Act, 25 U.S.C. §1322(a), which deals with state
court civil jurisdiction and imposition of state civil laws, .provides:
The consent of the United States is hereby given to any State not having
jurisdiction over civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians
are parties which arise in the areas of Indian Country situated within such
State to assume, with the consent of the tribe occupying the particular In- 13
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In Williams, the Court noted the existence of the Act of August 15,
1953, commonly referred to as P.L. 280. 71 However, the Williams Court,
unlike the Court in Kennerly, did not call that act a "governing Act of
Congress," so as to preclude any possible application of the Williams
substantive test to the problem of state court jurisdiction. In Kennerly,
on the other hand, the Court chose to label the act of 1953 a "governing
Act of Congress," and in so doing effectively abolished the Williams
test insofar as it was theretofore applicable to state court civil juris-
diction over actions which arise in Indian Country and involve Indians.
The reason for the abolition is simple: by its own terms, the Williams
test is only applicable "absent governing Acts of Congress.' '72
The rule of Kennerly--dictated not by prior court decisions, but by
the fact that there presently exists a "governing Act of Congress"-is
that state courts have no jurisdiction over civil actions by or against
Indians which arise within the exterior boundaries of an Indian reser-
vation, unless there is an express Congressional grant of such juris-
diction together with compliance with the conditions precedent, if any,
of the express Congressional grant.73 The rule is as absolute as it appears;
that is, there are no exceptions to it.7 4
Manifestly, there are two limitations on the rule of Kennerly. First,
the Court's opinion spoke only of the problem of state court jurisdiction,
and did not consider the question of the imposition of state laws. Never-
theless, it must be noted that the present "governing Act of Congress" 75
makes provision not only for state court jurisdiction, but also for exten-
sion to Indians in Indian Country of "those civil laws of such State
that are of general application to private persons or private property."
dian Country or part thereof which would be affected by such assumption,
such measure of jurisdiction over any or all such civil causes of action
arising within such Indian Country or any part thereof as may be deter-
mined by such State to the same extent that such State has jurisdiction over
other civil causes of action, and those civil laws of such State that are of
general application to private persons or private property shall have the
same force and effect within such Indian Country or part thereof as they
have elsewhere within that State.
"The pertinent portion of this act is set forth in note 68, supra. See, Williams, supra
note 3 at 222-223.
"Williams, supra note 3 at 220.
"The "governing Act of Congress', an express Congressional grant of general state
court civil jurisdiction over actions that arise within Indian Country and involve
Indians, is, today, Title IV, CIVIL RIGHTs ACT OF 1968 §402(a). There are, in addi-
tion, a number of specific express Congressional grants of state court jurisdiction.
E.g., 25 U.S.C. §231 (1929, 45 Stat. 1185; amended 1946, 60 Stat. 962), which
authorizes states to enforce some of their health and education laws on Indian reser-
vations with respect to Indians.
74The Montana Supreme Court has correctly recognized the absolute nature of the
Kennerly rule. In a dictum in the recent case of Crow Tribe of Indians v. Deernose,
supra note 19, the Court said at 1136, citing Kennerly:
It is abundantly clear that state court jurisdiction in Indian affairs on
reservations does not ixist in the absence of an express statutory grant of
such jurisdiction by Congress together with strict compliance with the pro-
v sions of such statutory grant. (Emphasis supplied.)
"Title IV, Crvm RIGHTS ACT OF 1968, §'.402(a).
[ Vol. 33
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If this act is a "governing Act of Congress" for purposes of state court
jurisdiction, there is absolutely no reason why it is not a "governing Act
of Congress" for the purpose of the imposition of state civil laws. If
that is the case, and it ought clearly to be so, then the Williams test,
insofar as it may have been applicable to impositions by the states of
their laws and courts on reservation Indians, is Ao longer the law.76
And this will continue so long as the present "governing Act of Con-
gress," or something that closely resembles it,. remains unrepealed or
held invalid. Second, the Kennerly rule and the present "governing Act
of Congress" are not concerned with state court jurisdiction or imposition
of state laws with respect to matters within an Indian reservation that
involve or effect only non-Indians. To determine the validity of state
action with respect to non-Indians on an Indian reservation one must
still look, so far as federal law is concerned, to decisions of the United
States Supreme Court and acts of Congress; that is, such state action
ought to be held valid only if: 1) it does not infringe on the right of
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them-to
govern the internal affairs of a reservation ;77 and 2) it is not contrary to
federal law. 78
CONCLUSION
With respect to state court jurisdiction, because of Kennerly, states
have no power to exercise court jurisdiction over civil actions by or
against Indians that arise within Indian country, absent an express Con-
gressional grant of such jurisdiction together with compliance with the
terms, if any, of the grant. Moreover, under Kennerly, courts should
hold that states have no power to impose their civil laws on reservation
Indians without an express Congressional grant of such power together
with compliance with the terms, if any, of the grant. The same result
could be achieved by a strict interpretation of a disclaimer provision,
if the state has such a provision.
States may impose their laws and courts with respect to matters
within an Indian reservation that do not involve or effect Indians so
long as the imposition is not contrary to federal law, does not infringe
"
6 An argument could be made that Title IV, CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1968, § 402(a) was
intended to speak exclusively to the problem of state court jurisdiction, and that the
phrase "those civil laws of such state that are of general application to private per-
sons or private property shall have the same force and effect within such Indian
Country or part thereof as they shall have elsewhere within that State" means only
that, in a civil action involving Indians which arises in Indian Country, state (not
tribal) law is to be applied. The author woud object to such an interpretation on the
ground that it seems contrary to the primary rule of statutory interpretation, the
"plain-meaning" rule. Of course, the author does realize that one man's plain-
meaning is another's ambiguity, and that one often sees plainly only that which he
wants to see. As usual, legislative intent is unclear. See, 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. AND
ADM. NEWS 1837, 1865-1866.
7See, Williams v. Lee, supra note 3 at 219-220.
'sSee, Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, supra note 9 at 75; and Warren Trading
Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Commission, supra note .O at .690. 15
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on the rights of Indians to regulate the internal affairs of a reservation,
and is not contrary to the manner in which the state interprets its dis-
claimer provision, if the state has such a disclaimer.
Whether these principles are "good" or "bad" for Indians is one of
policy, which the author is woefully unqualified to answer.79 This note
is an attempt only to discover what the law is; not what the law ought
to be. At present, the determination of what ought to be rests in the
hands of state legislatures, Congress, and the Indians themselves.
7OConsiderations of legal and practical policy are dealt with infra.
[Vol. 33
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